Resilience in defense supply chains

Resilient supply chains are essential for military preparedness. Without spare parts, fuel and ammunition, even the most advanced armed forces will grind to a halt. But what exactly does resilience in defense supply chains look like? And what does it take to build resilient supply chains — particularly in times of crisis? Ralph Eberspaecher, Partner at 4flow and responsible for 4flow’s defense practice, addresses these and other questions in the following interview.

How do you define “resilience” in a defense supply chain, and which core objectives should take priority?

For me, resilience in a defense supply chain is the ability to cope with severe pressure and disruptions, to adapt, to continue delivering under adverse conditions and to rapidly restore defined capabilities. That is what matters in a defense supply chain: a network that is efficient in peacetime is not automatically resilient in a crisis or in high‑intensity conflict.
Resilience is not merely an inventory/stock issue; it is primarily an end‑to‑end planning, control and decision‑making task across the entire supply network.

What role should state industrial and procurement policy play — for example through strategic stockpiles or incentive programs — in enhancing supply security?

A central one. For defense‑critical supply chains the state cannot simply rely on markets always making the correct microeconomic choices. With small quantities, long certification processes, high entry barriers and holding‑costs, structural gaps otherwise emerge. From the public perspective it is about actively shaping supply security; from industry’s perspective it is about reliable signals so investments in capacity, second sources and skills become economically viable. Crucially, the state must not only build and buy resilience capabilities when a crisis is already apparent. It must anticipate and prepare them and then develop them contractually, financially and organizationally.

What methods or tools are available for scenario analyses and “what‑if” stress tests — for war, sanctions or natural disasters?

The first important step is to move from a single supply chain view to a real network understanding. Only then can realistic scenarios be modelled. In practice, metrics such as time‑to‑recover and time‑to‑survive have proven particularly useful. They show how long a supplier, factory, transport corridor or repair node can be out of service before one’s own capability is harmed. 

The model should capture real dependencies and scenarios, including re‑qualification times, bottleneck materials, escalation rules, prioritization logics and the question of who, in a crisis, decides over scarce stocks, substitutions or reallocations. From an industrial perspective these metrics help prioritize redundancy, inventory and ramp‑up decisions. From a military perspective they must be tied to operational capabilities — e.g. available systems, MRO throughput or munition ranges. These analyses can today be represented in APS environments, control‑tower logics and scenario‑based planning models.

How should dependencies on non‑allied suppliers or on critical raw materials such as rare earths be handled?

One must distinguish between global procurement and unilateral, potentially dangerous strategic dependence. For defense‑critical components or materials you must avoid being in a position where export restrictions, political tensions or deliberate influence can endanger readiness. The answer is not reflexive autarky but a portfolio approach. Industry needs much greater visibility of risks down into Tier‑3 to Tier‑n structures. The public sector must support transparency, diversification and — where sovereignty concerns require it — political and financial measures. For raw materials such as germanium, the crucial point is not only knowing alternative sources but understanding whether they are qualified, re‑qualifiable and actually substitutable for the intended application.

How can public tenders be designed so they reward resilience without creating competitive distortions?

Resilience should be defined as a transparent, measurable performance criterion. Public tenders should therefore consider not just price and standard suitability criteria but the provider’s actual capability profile. Assessable factors include qualified second sources, documented emergency plans, defined restart times, transparency in the sub‑supplier network, obsolescence concepts and demonstrable cyber‑supply‑chain security. Proof requirements must remain proportionate and manageable for bidders.

Resilience ultimately needs to be secured — for example through minimum transparency in critical supply chains, reporting obligations for Tier‑n failures, auditability of cyber‑security measures, naming of second sources and options for surge volumes. These criteria must be proportionate, verifiable and comprehensible to all bidders. That links resilience with equal treatment and integrity in procurement. Tiered approaches are sensible: start with low‑threshold trials and parallel qualification, then scale via framework contracts. That is important for industry and especially SMEs, because market entry often fails purely due to upfront costs.

Which logistics and distribution concepts — e.g. regional buffer stocks, forward‑positioning or multi‑source transit routes — are especially robust against disruptions?

The most suitable concepts combine redundancy with intelligent control. A single central depot can be efficient but is often too vulnerable in a crisis. You therefore need a combination of central stocks, decentralized warehouses, forward‑positioning near operations, alternative routes and contingency nodes. Multi‑route concepts are important because different disruptions require different responses. In the defense context one must today also think in terms of “contested logistics” — not just random disruption but deliberate attacks on nodes, hubs and connections. 

Military planners must consider both sustainment and deployability together. Industry must orchestrate material flows, repair and returns dynamically. Good resilience therefore does not arise from maximal stockpiles everywhere but from the ability to redeploy stocks, transport options, repair capacity and priorities rapidly. Examples include NATO approaches to ammunition resupply and the use of additive manufacturing to make spare parts available closer to the point of use or maintenance.

How do you integrate obsolescence management into lifecycle planning for military systems?

I see obsolescence management as early detection and active steering of availability risks across the entire operational life of a system. It must be part of lifecycle planning from the outset and not only begin when a component is suddenly discontinued. Today obsolescence affects hardware assemblies as well as software versions, tooling, semiconductors, test equipment, special tools, data packages and IP rights. 

Practically this means: identify critical components and dependencies early, monitor connected risks systematically, prepare technical alternatives, plan procurement cycles, create technology roadmaps and design re‑qualification processes in advance. From a military perspective, obsolescence management is an immediate readiness issue because availability, repair and modernization depend directly on it.

Which forms of cooperation among NATO partners have proven effective in avoiding shortages of critical components? 

From my perspective three cooperation forms have been particularly effective: 

1. Joint procurement, because pooled demand creates investment security for industry.
2. Joint support and sustainment models — i.e. partnerships for spare parts, repair, training and ammunition management.
3. Shared data and coordination structures to detect bottlenecks early and steer prioritized distribution. 

What role do digitization, data management and defense supply chain control tower play for resilience?

A very large role — provided digitization is truly thought through end‑to‑end. A supply chain control tower is not merely a dashboard or KPI system; its purpose is to prepare and execute decisions. In the defense context that requires role‑ and rights concepts under secrecy protection, data rights and IP handling between public purchasers and industry, emergency concepts, manual fallback processes and sufficient cyber‑security for suppliers. 

Militarily this is essential because resilience in crisis depends on early detection of disruptions, correct prioritization and effective allocation of scarce resources. For industry it enables scenario calculations, faster production and logistics decisions and visibility of dependencies beyond Tier‑1. Time‑to‑awareness and time‑to‑action are therefore at least as important as classic delivery KPIs.

What is the most important lesson from the war in Ukraine for European defense supply chains?

There are many lessons. With regard to resilience the decisive insight for me is that endurance matters more than peacetime optimization. Much that was efficient in peacetime — minimal stocks, narrowly dimensioned production ramps, singular procurement logics or insufficient MRO depth — proves inadequate under real pressure. From that follow practical imperatives:

• Europe must plan ammunition and spare part consumption and replacement far more realistically.
• It needs repair, refurbishment and re‑qualification capabilities that can deliver under severe time pressure.
• Procurement, prioritization, innovation and industrial ramp‑up must be much faster.

For Europe the conclusion is clear: resilience must become a planning premise rather than an exception — across procurement, industrial policy, logistics and ongoing sustainment.

The interview was conducted by the industry magazine Aerospace & Defence and was published on their website, as well: Resilience in defence supply chains "The Ability to Cope with Severe Pressure".